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Bless The Tie That Binds: A Puritan-Covenant
Case for Same-Sex Marriage
Dwight J. Penas*
Introduction
An increasing number of legal scholars and students, practic-
ing attorneys, lobbyists and legislators, and private individuals are
calling for the legal recognition of gay and lesbian marriages.1
Those writers claim that the denial of legal status for such mar-
riages violates basic legal and moral guarantees of American law.
2
They also argue that full legal recognition of same-sex marriage
would be good for society as a whole.3 The commentators advance
various rationales for their arguments. Absent, however, from
their analyses is attention to one significant authority. That over-
looked authority is Puritan4 ideology 5 - specifically, the concept
* J.D. 1991, University of Minnesota Law School; M.S. 1983, University of Illi-
nois at Urbana-Champaign; M. Div. 1976, Lutheran Theological Seminary at Gettys-
burg, Pennsylvania; B.A. 1972, Concordia College, Moorhead, Minnesota.
1. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 1508, 1603-11 (1989) [hereinafter Developments]; Note, From this Day
Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 Yale L.J. 1783
(1988) (written by Claudia Lewis); Comment, The Necessity for State Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family,
3 Berkeley Women's L.J. 134 (1987-88) (written by Alissa Friedman); James D.
Weinrich, Task Force Findings: Overview and Prospect, in Homosexuality: Social,
Psychological, and Biological Issues 377 (William Paul, James D. Weinrich, John C.
Gonsiorek, and Mary E. Hotvedt eds. 1982) [hereinafter Homosexuality]; Andrew
Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom, The New Republic, August 28, 1989, at 20. See
generally Homosexuality, supra (the book is the report of the Task Force on Sex-
ual Orientation the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, which is a
division of the American Psychological Association.), and Richard Mohr, Gays/Jus-
tice: A Study of Ethics, Society, and Law (1988) (philosophical musings on a
number of issues that arise from the intersection of homosexuality and law).
2. See, e.g., Note, supra note 1; Comment, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 1.
4. There is no single, commonly accepted definition of "Puritan." In general,
however, the Puritans were British Calvinists who were zealous in their efforts to
reform religion and society. Edmund Morgan has suggested a useful, non-technical
definition of Puritan:
The Puritans were English Protestants who thought the Church of
England as established under Henry VIII and Elizabeth retained too
many vestiges of Rom[an Catholicism]. In the 1640's [sic] and 1650's
[sic] they reorganized not only the church but also the government of
England and for eleven years ran the country without a king. When
the monarchy was restored in 1660, Puritans were disgraced, but their
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of covenant in Puritan theology and social thought. As ironic as it
may seem, Puritan values-and especially those embodied in the
notion of covenant--encourage reversal of the hostility which con-
temporary marraige law manifests toward same-sex couples.
The Puritans were a principal influence6 on American
thought and polity during America's formative decades. 7 Puritan
work could not be wholly undone. Moreover, in the 1630's [sic] they
had carried their ideas to the New World, where the king could not
undo them.
Edmund S. Morgan, Introduction, Puritan Political Ideas 1558-1794, at xiv (Ed-
mund S. Morgan ed. 1965). See also John Witte, Jr., Blest Be the Ties That Bind-
Covenant and Community in Puritan Thought, 36 Emory L.J. 579, 579 (1987);
Goldwin Smith, The United States: An Outline of a Political History 1492-1871, at 4
(1893).
Not all scholars define the Puritan movement so inclusively. Margo Todd, for
example, stresses that Puritans "were a self-conscious community of [Calvinist]
protestant zealots committed to purging the Church of England from within of its
remaining Romish 'superstitions,' ceremonies, vestments and liturgy, and to estab-
lishing a biblical discipline on the larger society, primarily through the preached
word." Margo Todd, Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order 14 (1987)
(emphasis added). She thus distinguishes Separatists (such as the Plymouth Pil-
grims) from other Puritans, even though the two groups shared common theologi-
cal and social points of view. Id. See also Allan Nevins and Henry Steele
Commager, A Short History of the United States 8-16 (5th ed. 1966).
The term "Puritan" was, originally, a term of opprobrium, highlighting a kind
of "holier-than-thou" attitude within the reformist party. Leon Howard, Essays on
Puritans and Puritanism 41 (1986). By the end of the sixteenth century, however,
Puritan persistence "had rescued the term from contempt and given it a definable
meaning with reference to church government and morality." Id. at 3. There re-
mains in the modern, colloquial use of the term some of the earlier connotations of
excessive strictness and sobriety. Throughout this paper, however, the term is used
with no overtones of disfavor. "Puritan" denotes the biologic or ideologic heirs of
the British reformers who came to the New World to escape scorn and persecution
in England and were instrumental in shaping what became the United States.
5. "Ideology" is used to include both theological and non-theological reflection
and is used with no pejorative connotation.
6. Puritanism was one of the most important influences on the development of
American identity and polity. See, e.g., John Witle, Jr., How to Govern a City on a
Hill: The Early Puritan Contribution to American Constitutionalism, 39 Emory
L.J. 41 (1990). It was not, however, the only one. In explaining historical develop-
ments, it is important to avoid what Ralph Barton Perry called "the fallacy of the
definite article":
It is customary to refer to any reason or cause by which an event can
be explained or controlled as the reason or cause. But in all historical
situations there are many reasons and many causes; and if one of these
is singled out for attention, it should be referred to as a reason or a
cause....
Ralph Barton Perry, Puritanism and Democracy 33 (1944) (emphasis in the
original).
7. American polity is an amalgam of influences that entered the American
continent at different times-most of them from Europe. Puritanism was the earli-
est of the European influences. Richard Schlatter, The Puritan Strain, in The Re-
construction of American History 27-28 (John Higham ed. 1962). Tocqueville
discovered that a Puritan religious ethos permeated America at the very "cradle of
its infancy." He saw a necessary connection between political freedom and Puritan
(Vol. 8:533
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concepts and metaphors guided those who led the War for Inde-
pendence8 and who designed the political structures of the nascent
republic.9 According to one scholar, "[t]he remarkable coherence
of the American revolutionary movement and its successful con-
clusion in the constitution of a new civil order are due in consider-
able part to the convergence of the Puritan covenant pattern [of
thought] and the Montesquieuan republican pattern."10 Another
scholar has said, "[w]ithout some understanding of Puritanism....
there is no understanding of America.""
religious beliefs. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 31-47 (1968). Puri-
tanism established the context for the political and intellectual movements that
came later. Id. In his many works, Perry Miller documents the pre-eminence of
Puritan influence on the development of American intellectual history and on
American polity. See, e.g., Perry Miller, Errand into the Wilderness (1956) [herein-
after Errand]; and Perry Miller and Thomas H. Johnson, The Puritans (1938).
8. Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, in
Puritan New England: Essays on Religion, Society, and Culture 364 (Alden T.
Vaughan and Francis J. Bremer eds. 1977). Morgan traces key concepts by which
Americans justified the War for Independence to what he calls "the Puritan
Ethic"-a unique synthesis of ideas and values which Puritans imprinted on the
emerging nation. Id. See also infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
To cite one illustration: Puritan influence on Thomas Jefferson may be de-
duced from his formulation in the Declaration of Independence that the States
were compelled toward independence by "the laws of nature and of nature's God."
Declaration of Independence. The deistic Jefferson was loathe to acknowledge an
intimate link between the earth and the clockmaker-like creator who wound the
spring and set the world to work on its own. Nonetheless, in announcing grounds
for the Colonies' separation from Britain, he invoked images both from the deism
he espoused and from the primarily Puritan protestantism of his day. Sanford Lev-
inson, Constitutional Faith 1 (1988).
Similarly, the Preamble to the Constitution declares that the purpose of the
Constitution is "to form a more perfect union ... [and] promote the general wel-
fare." Perfect union and general welfare were Puritan notions that expressed the
Puritan understanding of the purpose of government. Cf infra notes 191-96 and
accompanying text.
9. Puritan ideology lay behind many of the purely secular political principles
of the new nation. See Morgan, supra note 4. Hannah Arendt asserted that free-
dom in America originated in the "covenanted" community that was a Puritan in-
novation in America. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 171 (1963).
The argument is not that the Puritans were the only group important for the
development of American law or that Puritanism was the material source of such
documents as the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution. The Constitu-
tional Convention, for example, did not attempt to establish a Puritan republic- as
the Plymouth Pilgrims had attempted (and, indeed, as many Puritans would have
liked to do). Rather, the point is that Puritanism provided a significant element of
the intellectual and political matrix out of which the Declaration and Constitution
were formed. It bears repeating: Puritan thought is one-albeit one vitally impor-
tant-element of the background against which the Constitution was written and
should be interpreted.
10. Robert Bellah, The Broken Covenant 27 (1975).
11. Perry Miller, The Puritan Way of Life, in Miller and Johnson, supra note
7, at 1.
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A critical component in legal analysis is a sense of history.12
"We find our visions of good and evil... in the experience of the
past, in our tradition. ... "13 That is not to suggest that the past
determines the present and the future-in law any more than in
psychology or history. But it does point out that in legal analysis it
is necessary to account for both written sources of law (e.g., the
Constitution) and ideologies that lie behind those texts.14 As Jus-
tice Holmes explained:
The law embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries .... In order to know what it is, we must
know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We must
alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation.
But the most difficult labor will be to understand the combina-
tion of the two into new products at every stage.15
Such a "pragmatic" 16 approach is not enslaved to history, but it
recognizes the importance of history. That courts-most notably
12. Milner Ball indicates by implication the importance of history for legal
analysis:
In private law, precedent and the pull of deciding like cases alike, the
rule of stare decisis, is the agreed basis for decision. Stare decisis,
however, is really a theory of possibilities rather than a binding re-
striction. This being so, what determines the choice between available
precedents or constructions of fact that may determine the outcome of
a case? What does a judge turn to, and what in turn legitimates the
judicial decision?
Milner S. Ball, The Promise of American Law 7-8 (1981). History helps one to
make the decision about what precedents to apply. In constitutional interpretation,
for example, it is important-indeed, Ball indicates that it is necessary-to consult
the milieu out of which the Constitution grew. Id. By so doing, the interpreter dis-
covers the "reality" which the Constitution was meant to reflect and secure. I&
The interpreter is then able to exercise judgment in order to solve the particular
problem in ways consonant with the original values.
Ball's point is similar to that of Walter Murphy. Murphy insists that careful
attention to both the structure and the historical background of the Constitution
reveals a fundamental system of values that the Constitution was meant to pro-
mote. Those values are relevant to contemporary decisionmaking by virtue of their
being "constitutive" of the legal reality that the Constitution establishes. Faithful-
ness to the Constitution requires that laws and opinions give effect to those values.
Walter Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 704
(1980).
Thus, there are many ways in which the study of history informs legal deci-
sionmaking. Farber and Sherry also demonstrate and discuss the theory and prac-
tice of bringing history to bear in legal analysis, especially as it operates in theories
of "original intent." Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, A History of the Amer-
ican Constitution 347-71 (1990).
13. Alexander Bickel, The Morality of Consent 24 (1975).
14. Murphy, supra note 12, at 704-05 (1980). See also Daniel A. Farber, Legal
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1331 (1988) (describing pragma-
tism's eclectic approach to legal problem-solving, with its reliance on precedent, tra-
dition, legal text, and social policy).
15. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.
1963).
16. Farber and Sherry, supra note 12, at 393. See also Farber, supra note 14.
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the United States Supreme Court17-take history into account is
clear.'s Any effort to explain, justify, or change current legal posi-
tions must comprehend historical events, doctrines, and develop-
ments. The appreciation of history implicates historically
important social theories.19
Puritan ideology is one of the essential sources20 of American
law, and as such it is a valuable and authoritative source of insight
for resolving difficult legal issues. Puritan thought provides a his-
torical balance to other theoretical arguments-e.g., "original in-
tentionalism" 21 or majoritarian rule22 or "neutral principles" 2 3--
that claim historical authority.24 Puritan-covenant ideology com-
plements and corrects interpretive frameworks that root in other
social-political theories, 25 so that legal analysis is grounded in a
17. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (indicating that
fundamental liberties are those "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition").
18. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's use of "original intent" in its analy-
sis, see Farber and Sherry, supra note 12, at 351-71.
19. Anne Goldstein demonstrates that historically based understandings of so-
cial theory influence and confuse Supreme Court decisions. Comment, History, Ho-
mosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 Yale L.J. 1073 (written by Professor Anne Goldstein). In
castigating the Hardwick majority's inaccuracy and misuse of historical data, she
highlights the importance the Court attached to historical--as opposed to purely
legal- material.
20. "[IThe 'Constitution' of the United States... encompasses much more than
the formal document itself.... Like the 'constitutions' of all so-called Western de-
mocracies, that of the United States includes a tradition of ideals and practices that
evidence values and principles as vital as those formalized in the actual document."
Murphy, supra note 12, at 704-05.
21. E.g., Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of
a Limited Constitution, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455 (1986).
22. E.g., id. at 465 (arguing that "a jurisprudence of original intention" reflects
commitment to democracy, not government by judges).
23. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971).
24. Such arguments focus, for example, on the "original intent" of the authors
of the Constitution. E.g., Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (1977); and
Meese, supra note 21. For a demonstration that the founders themselves denied
the validity of "original intent" as an appropriate interpretive strategy, see H. Jef-
ferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885
(1985). Other arguments center on social contract theory, which the Constitution is
supposed to reflect. Farber and Sherry highlight the importance of John Locke's
philosophy as background of the Constitution. Farber and Sherry, supra note 12, at
6-13. Locke is one of the pre-eminent expositors of social contract theory.
Historians and philosophers demonstrate that historical "causes" are "consti-
tuted of common or interrelated interests and beliefs." Perry, supra note 6, at 33.
See Robin W. Lovin, Equality and Covenant Theology, 2 J.L. & Religion 241 (1984)
[hereinafter Lovin 1]. See generally Errand, supra note 7, and Miller and Johnson,
supra note 7 (both discussing the political implications of early American Puritan
theology). The study of law would benefit from the recognition of the complexity
of the sources of American law.
25. Cass Sunstein demonstrates how political theories correct and complement
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more complete understanding of the historical and intellectual mi-
lieu which produced American law.
This article argues that the implications of Puritan covenant
ideology encourage the legal recognition of marriage between gays
or lesbians. It is meant to complement--and certainly not to con-
tradict-trenchant legal arguments for the recognition of gay/les-
bian marriage. 26 It begins with a brief sketch of the history and
theology of the Puritan movement in America, to demonstrate the
authority of Puritanism for American law and to set forth Puritan-
ism's basic themes. The article goes on to infer basic jurispruden-
tial principles, or values, from that Puritan thought. It then
analyzes how those principles encourage the legal recognition of
same-sex marriage.
The Puritan Understanding of Life and Society
Historical Importance of the Puritans
The Puritans and their ideology were essential elements in
the development of American self-understanding and of American
law.27 Puritan influence was felt early in American history, since
Puritans were among the earliest white settlers in America. The
Pilgrims who landed at Plymouth in 1620 were Puritans.28 The
each other. Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L.
Rev. 29, 68-85 (1985). Sunstein contrasts two theories of governance, both sup-
ported by the text and background of the Constitution. He promotes "republican-
ism" (which is Puritan-like in its emphasis on civic virtue) as a balance to
"pluralism". One problem with the latter model, according to Sunstein, is its sus-
ceptibility to manipulation by "factions" who seek only their personal interests re-
gardless of the effect on others. Those factions may represent the majority or a
minority of the citizenry. A "republican" model prevents easy satisfaction with the
ability of factions to disregard the well-being of the larger society. For a discussion
of the differences between "classic republicanism" and "liberalism"-which the au-
thor more closely identifies with Puritanism-see John Patrick Diggins, The Lost
Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism
9-10 (1984).
26. See, e.g., Note, supra note 1, for a feminist-jurisprudential case for recogniz-
ing same-sex marriage, and Friedman, supra note 1, for an equal protection ration-
ale. See generally Homosexuality, supra note 1, for discussion of the issue from the
standpoint of the social sciences.
27. Perry Miller argues that Puritan theology was the "innermost propulsion of
the United States." Miller, supra note 7, at viii. See also Bernard Bailyn, The Ideo-
logical Origins of the American Revolution 32-33 (asserting that Puritanism pro-
vided an almost cosmic dimension to the development of American self-
understanding during the years preceding the War for Independence).
28. Jude P. Dougherty, Puritan Aspiration, Puritan Legacy: An Historicall
Philosophical Inquiry, 5 J.L. & Religion 109, 110 (1988). As indicated above, there
is some dispute over whether the Pilgrims should be considered Puritans. See
supra note 4. But see Evarts Boutell Greene, The Place of Pilgrims in American
History 23 (1921) ("The Plymouth Pilgrims... were only the first line of skirmish-
ers who spied out the land, the little vanguard of the great Puritan army").
[Vol. 8:533
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members of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, who arrived in 1629,
were Puritans. Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
and Pennsylvania also began as Puritan enclaves.29
Once established, Puritan colonies thrived and grew,3 0 and all
sections of the "new world"-not just "New England"- eventually
felt the Puritan influence.3 1 In the original thirteen colonies, for
example, an estimated eighty-five percent of the churches were
Puritan congregations.3 2 That religious dominance greatly influ-
enced the development of American social and political attitudes.
Puritan theology was a major intellectual force behind the
development of American "tradition, culture, institutions, and na-
tionality."3 3 Puritan thought about the nature of life and of soci-
ety encouraged and contributed to the formation of American
republican polity.34 Puritan theology inspired political doctrines
about human equality,35 participatory government,36 and concern
for the common good.37 Puritan influence is apparent from the
history of the formulation of the Declaration of Independence and
29. Dougherty, supra note 28, at 109.
30. For example, "[i]n the spring of 1630 John Winthrop reached Salem with
eleven ships carrying nine hundred settlers, enough to found eight new towns, in-
cluding Boston. The Massachusetts Bay Colony grew so rapidly that it was soon
throwing off branches to the south and west." Nevins and Commager, supra note
4, at 10. At least some of the planting of new Puritan colonies was the result of the
exile from established colonies of religious radicals. Those radicals (often zealous
Puritans themselves) founded colonies which also thrived. For example, after he
was exiled from Massachusetts, Roger Williams founded Rhode Island. Id. at 10.
Earliest Puritan settlements did not always embody the tolerance and respect that
ubderlay Puritan polity. See Dougherty, supra note 28, at 111.
31. Bailyn, supra note 27, at 33.
32. Dougherty, supra note 28, at 110.
33. Perry, supra note 6, at 34. Perry notes that "[p]uritan ideals were acquired
[by what became the United States) before and during the colonial period.... They
originated in the prenatal phases of American life and have predetermined the
whole of its later development." Perry, supra note 6, at 33-34. See also Bellah,
supra note 10, at 13-21; Lovin I, supra note 24, at 241 ("Nearly everyone agrees on
the seminal importance of Puritan social thought in America, but there is a similar
consensus on the decline of its influence [in recent decades].")
34. See generally Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L.J.
1493 (1988). That "republicanism" is not the only-or even most important-strain
of American intellectual and political thought which can claim Puritan sponsorship
is the central point made by Diggins. See Diggins, supra note 25.
35. See Lovin I, supra note 24. One historian has noted that "the Puritan the-
ory of church government had an influence on later American theories of democ-
racy." Schlatter, supra note 7, at 37. See infra notes 163-78 and accompanying text.
36. Morgan, supra note 8, at 371-72; Reinhold Niebuhr, The Idea of Covenant
and American Democracy, 23 Church Hist. 126 (1954). See infra notes 169-75 and
accompanying text. See also Winthrop Hudson, Theological Convictions and Dem-
ocratic Government, in Puritanism and the American Experience 226, 233 (Michael
McGiffert ed. 1969).
37. Lovin I, supra note 24, at 247. See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying
text.
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the Constitution of the United States.38 Even the fundamental im-
age of the United States as a "federation" or a "federal union"
roots in Puritan thought.39 M. Susan Power analyzed the political
writings of three early American Puritan leaders and found in
them the early expression of essential themes of American consti-
tutional government. 40
Puritan themes pervaded early American thought and were
especially prominent in the struggle to shape the polity of the new
nation.41 Winthrop Hudson summarizes the importance of Puri-
tanism in America:
[D]emocracy as we understand it in America was derived from
the three [Puritan] theological doctrines of the sovereignty of
God, human bondage to sin, and a particular understanding of
the way in which the implications of revelation are made
known and confirmed. From these three doctrines, in turn,
were derived an insistence upon fundamental law, limitation
of power, and the efficacy of discussion and persuasion. 42
Hudson understands those three political doctrines-fundamental
law, limitation of power, and the freedom of speech---as the core
38. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 8, at 22. Diggins points out that the Puritan
John Adams was the "Constitutional theorist" who devoted the most time and re-
flection to the Constitution of the United States. Diggins, supra note 25, at 69. The
influence of Calvinist-Puritanism on Adams is unmistakable. Id. at 71. Hamilton
and Madison also articulated Calvinist-Puritan themes in their efforts on behalf of
the Constitution. Id. at 9. Thus, while the Constitution was by no means the effort
solely of Puritans, it was in large measure shaped and promoted by Puritans and
Puritan ideology.
39. "Federal" was a common synonym for "covenant" in Puritan theological
writings (from the Latin foedus, covenant). The popularity of the notion of federal
bonds among the colonies/states reflects Puritan understandings of relationships
among people-whether person-to-person or on a national level--as characterized
by mutual interdependence without the sacrifice of individual integrity. See, e.g.,
Niebuhr, supra note 36, at 132.
40. M. Susan Power, Before the Convention: Religion and the Founders (1984).
The men are John Winthrop, the first governor of Massachusetts; Thomas Hooker,
the original settler of Connecticut (of whom John Locke was an admirer); and
John Dickinson, author of the Articles of Confederation. Of them she says, "The
thoughts and deeds of these founders are the original American tradition. It is,
most importantly, a tradition derived from the religious convictions of the founders
.... The founders' complex achievement paved the way for the constitutional fram-
ers' accomplishments." Id. at 32.
41. In part because of the strength of their intellects, Puritan divines, scholars,
and politicians exercised enormous influence beyond Puritan communities and be-
yond New England: "Until quite recently New England dominated American cul-
ture and New England was wholly Puritan in origin." Schlatter, supra note 7, at
27. See Errand, supra note 7. Niebuhr asserts that Puritan values and images were
fundamental to the development of American polity. Niebuhr, supra note 36.
42. Hudson, supra note 36, at 227. See also Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Un-
written Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 1128-34 (1987) (discussing the promi-
nence of notions of fundamental law in the theory of governance of the Founders).
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values around which America was "constituted."43
The Theological Foundation of Puritan Social Thought
To urge renewed appreciation for the Puritans is not to sug-
gest the adoption of their particular theological or religious stance.
Even in the early days the peculiarly religious character of Puri-
tanism was rapidly displaced, even among strict Puritan groups, by
the secular concerns of settling the new nation, including govern-
ment, law, trade, and war.44 What began as a theological move-
ment was transformed into a more generalized social theory.
Nevertheless, Puritanism was religious in its origins,45 and some
sense of Puritan theology is necessary in order to understand secu-
larized Puritan social theory.
Puritans understood themselves to be agents46 of God on
earth, entrusted with responsibility for subjecting all aspects of life
to God's rule.4 7 They were convinced that they had special duties
in the world. All of life was infused with a potential for
ministry.48
At the heart of Puritan thought about religion and life-as
Perry Miller has called it, the "marrow of puritan divinity"49-was
the notion of covenant.5° A covenant is a mutually beneficial rela-
tionship formed when two parties pledge absolute faithfulness to
each other.5 1 A covenant shares some of the features of a contract,
in that each party can hold the other accountable for the terms of
the arrangement-an arrangement to which both parties freely as-
sent.52 It is, however, a broader concept than contract, one more
akin to romantic notions of marriage: Each party commits, as an
integral aspect of the agreement, to remain bound by the agree-
ment even in the event of the other's breach.53 The Puritans
43. Id. at 226.
44. 1 Sidney Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People 129 (1979).
45. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
46. They believed themselves specially chosen--or "elected"-by God to accom-
plish God's purposes in the world. Witte, supra note 4, at 591.
47. Niebuhr, supra note 36, at 130-33. See also Witte, supra note 4, at 590.
48. See Niebuhr, supra note 36, at 130-31.
49. Perry Miller, The Marrow of Puritan Divinity, in Errand, supra note 7, at
48.
50. Witte, supra note 4, at 579. Witte quotes a Puritan theologian writing in
1597: "The whole of God's Word... has to do with some covenant .. " Id. at 581-
82.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 587.
53. Id. at 585 ("Man's [sic] fall into sin did not abrogate the covenant.... All
men [sic] still stood in covenant relation with [God]."). For an elaboration on the
differences between contract and covenant theories, see Lovin I, supra note 24.
1990]
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structured their entire theological system around the notions of a
covenant between God and humanity and of human covenants that
reflected the divine-human covenant.5 4 Covenant became the cen-
tral motif in the exposition of Puritan thought about both religion
and society.55
For the Puritans, the history of the human race was suffused
with covenants.5 6 At the creation of the world, God had estab-
lished a covenant with humanity. In general terms, God promised
to care for and protect the human race;57 humans for their part
were to live according to God's will and to care for and protect one
another.5 8 Eventually, humanity failed to fulfill its covenantal re-
sponsibilities, but God did not abandon humanity.5 9 Instead, God
established a new covenant with humanity through Jesus-who
fulfilled the original covenant vicariously for humanity.60
Though the second covenant-or "covenant of grace"6L--was
built on faith, it nevertheless incorporated some aspects of the ear-
lier covenant, the so-called "covenant of works." 62 The covenant
of grace "repeat[ed] and embellish[ed] for sinful [humans] the
terms of the old covenant.... Both required that the faithful be-
liever lead his [sic] life in devotion, service, and praise of God-not
as a condition of salvation, but as an expression of gratitude for
God's grace and mercy."63 Within this scheme, every believer had
a contribution to make. Each person was created with a unique
54. Witte, supra note 4. For the British Puritan John Preston, covenant was
"the foundation for the whole history and structure of Christian theology": "Y]ou
must know [the Covenant] for it is the ground of all you hope for, it is that that
every man [sic] is built upon, you ha[v]e no other ground but this, God ha[s] made a
Co[v]enant with you, and you are in Co[v]enant with him." Errand, supra note 7,
at 60 (spelling adapted to modern conventions).
55. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 60; Witte, supra note 4, at 579; Lovin I,
supra note 24, at 241; Robin W. Lovin, Covenantal Relationships and Political Le-
gitimacy, 60 J. Religion 1 (1980) [hereinafter Lovin II].
56. The term is used throughout the Bible. Early in the Bible, the term denotes
the arrangement whereby God promised, following the Exodus of Israel from
Egypt, to make the people of Israel his own special people and they consequently
promised to live according to his commandments. Exodus 19-34. The Puritans read
the notion of covenant back from the Exodus into the stories of the creation of hu-
manity, Adam and Eve, in Genesis 1-3. Witte, supra note 4, at 583-84. They thereby
invested the relationships between God and humanity with covenantal significance
from the beginning of the world. See also Errand, supra note 7, at 63-71.
57. Errand, supra note 7, at 61 (quoting Richard Sibbes, a seventeenth-century
Puritan divine: "God for his [sic] part [of the agreement between God and 'poor
creatures'], undertakes to convey all that concerns our happiness .....
58. Witte, supra note 4, at 585-86.
59. Id.; Witte, supra note 4, at 60-63; Morgan, supra note 4, at xx-xvi.
60. Witte, supra note 4, at 585; Errand, supra note 7, at 62.
61. Witte, supra note 4, at 586; Errand, supra note 7, at 62.
62. Witte, supra note 4, at 583.
63. Id.
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combination of traits and talents which she was expected to em-
ploy in the service of God.
The Puritans understood both covenants to require service to
one's neighbor.64 The covenant between God and humankind had
its correlate in the believer's covenant with her neighbors and
with the physical universe. The Puritans understood life to be a
vital and exuberant-if sober and responsible-embrace of the
world as the place where one expressed her devotion and service
to God.65 Care for and service to one's neighbor were a part of
worship, on a par with singing psalms and preaching sermons.66
Covenant theology impressed on Puritans that human life is
essentially communal. Human being is defined in terms of rela-
tionships with others. 67 Every human event and relationship (cov-
enant) is a reflection of the covenant between God and the human
race, and each is invested with divine significance.68
64. In this regard, the Puritans were true to their Calvinist roots. See Dwight
J. Penas, Always Settling, Never Settled: Family Life Among Contemporary
Yankees 13-18 (Unpublished Master of Science Thesis, 1983) (copy on file with Law
and Inequality).
65. 1&
66. Todd, supra note 4, at 133-39; Lovin I, supra note 24, at 253.
67. Covenant theory does not deny that individual existence is important. But
covenant theory understands relationships-not individuals-to be the basic unit of
society. In that regard it is distinct from social contract theory, with which it is
often confused. For social contract theory, the individual is the basic unit of soci-
ety. Lovin I, supra note 24, at 244.
Social contract theory in its broad sense roots in the philosophy of Thomas
Hobbes (see Leviathan (1651)) and John Locke (see Two Treatises on Civil Govern-
ment (1690)). While there are differences in the perspectives of the two, there is a
relative congruence in their views. For both, human beings exist in nature as iso-
lated individuals. The natural human state is the individual's striving to satisfy her
needs and wants. See Lovin II, supra note 55, at 6-7 (summarizing Hobbes' expla-
nation). Liberty is the unrestrained freedom to use whatever force is necessary to
fulfill individual desires. Id at 6. In a state of nature, human beings represent
threats to each other's well-being, by competing for resources. Society is possible
only when individuals give up some measure of their individual liberty to fulfill
their needs and desires. See id. at 7.
Social contract theory posits that human society arose when-and continues to
exist because-individuals consent (or contract) to forego asserting some of their
liberty in exchange for others' promise to forego some of theirs. Id. at 8. As neces-
sary as it is if human beings are to live together, such a "social contract" represents
a profound challenge to individual integrity and a frustration of the individual's
push for self-assertion. Society, or government, is fundamentally an unnatural con-
dition. See Lovin II, supra note 55, for a concise comparison of social contract the-
ory with covenant theory.
Covenant theory does not deny that individuals are important. But it under-
stands social relationships to be the basic unit of existence. See id. See also infra
notes 134-40 and accompanying text. See generally Perry Miller, The Theory of the
State and of Society, in Miller and Johnson, supra note 7, at 181-94.
68. Lovin I, supra note 24, at 247 ("[O]ne essential partner in every Puritan
covenant [between people] is God.")
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Puritan notions of covenantal relationship are clearly mani-
fested in the Puritan doctrine of marriage, which Puritans under-
stood to be a covenant between a man and a woman.69 Puritans
played down the Anglican view of marriage as "an expression of
the natural requirements of procreation." 70 Instead, Puritans em-
phasized the partnership of marriage: Puritan sermons on mar-
riage emphasized mutual help, affection, and respect.71 Puritans
married with an open-eyed understanding that in marriage they
undertook serious obligations toward their spouses. 72 For that rea-
son, there was an emphasis on a person's freedom to choose
whether or not and whom to marry.73 In addition, marriage
served an iconic function, exemplifying in microcosm the love and
co-operation, service and care that the city, state, and nation were
to practice.74 As one Puritan writer put it in the sixteenth cen-
tury: "A household is, as it were, a little commonwealth, by the
good government whereof, God's glorie may be advanced, the com-
monwealth which standeth of several families, benefitted, and all
that live in that familie may receive much comfort and
commodities."75
But the Puritan doctrine of covenant embraced realms wider
than the family: The emphasis on covenantal service led Puritans
to emphasize the believer's duty to contribute to the "common
good." 76 "Living in covenant [meant] regarding persons and events
with an unselfish eye, with a view to the whole rather than to a
partial [individual] interest." 77 The Puritans were by no means
communitarians. 78 But they were conscious that those well-off
69. Puritans held marriage in high regard as a state ordained by God. Never-
theless, they de-sacralized marriage and made marriage a civil matter. For several
years they considered weddings which occurred in church to be illegal. Christopher
Durston, The Family in the English Revolution 16 (1989).
70. Lovin II, supra note 55, at 5.
71. Id.
72. Witte, supra note 4, at 594-95.
73. Durston, supra note 69. See generally Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex
and Marriage in England 1500-1800, at 325-34 (1977) (on the rise of "companionate
marriage" in England parallel to that within Puritan society in New England).
Both men and women enjoyed great freedom with respect to decisions about
marriage.
74. Witte, supra note 4, at 594-95.
75. Robert Gataker, quoted in id., at 595.
76. Robin Lovin notes the frequency of Puritan sermons emphasizing the duty
of mutual help. Lovin II, supra note 55, at 5. See also infra note 81 and accompa-
nying text for an example of that preaching. See also E. Clinton Gardiner, Justice
in the Puritan Covenantal Tradition, 6 J.L. & Religion 39 (1988).
77. Lovin H, supra note 55, at 6.
78. See Todd, supra note 4, at 127-39; Lovin II, supra note 55, at 256. To cite
one example: The Puritans, while aware of dangers associated with wealth, did not
despise wealth per se. They were, however, profoundly concerned with the ways in
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should help those less-well-off. 79 By employing its God-given in-
telligence, humanity would address human problems in such a way
that everyone was better off.80
The "common good" encompassed community and nation as
well as personal relationships.8 ' Puritans understood their individ-
ual destinies to be wrapped up with the political subdivisions in
which they lived. For example, before landing in Massachusetts,
John Winthrop exhorted his fellow travelers to form the kind of,
closely knit and care-filled society that would fulfill God's cove-
nantal requirements and assure the Puritan community's success
in the New World:
[W]ee must be knit together in this worke as one man [sic],
wee must entertaine each other in brotherly [sic] Affeccion,
wee must be willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluities,
for the supply of others necessities . . .wee must .. .make
others Condicions our owne, rejoyce together, mourne to-
gether, labor and suffer together .... 82
Winthrop's sermon indicates the inter-relatedness of all spheres of
life in Puritan ideology. Community and nation were religious
concerns as much as church and home.8 3
Whether at the level of the community or at the level of the
nation, political covenants, like personal covenants, were "tri-party
agreement[s among] God, the civil ruler, and the people."8 4 Civil
rulers were to be accorded great respect because they represented
God's authority to the society and guided the society in living ac-
cording to God's will.85 Such respect did not require absolute obe-
dience, however. If the ruler violated God's will, it was the
people's responsibility to replace the unsatisfactory ruler with one
faithful to the ways of God.86
which wealth was created and enjoyed. Stewardship and business ethics were well-
developed themes in Puritan social thought. Todd, supra note 4, at 154-58.
79. Lovin II, supra note 55, at 257; Todd, supra note 4, at 127-39.
80. Lovin I, supra note 24, at 6.
81. Witte, supra note 4, at 590.
82. Bellah, supra note 10, at 14 (quoting John Winthrop).
83. Miller, supra note 67.
84. Witte, supra note 4, at 592.
85. Id at 593.
86. Lovin I, supra note 24, at 254-56. Thomas Jefferson's motto may have been
inspired by Puritans: "Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God." Perry, supra note
6, at [frontispiece]. The motto was cited by one of modern times' most consistent
Puritan legatees, The Rev. Mr. William Sloane Coffin, Jr., in a symposium about
civil disobedience. Coffin argued (against the position of U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tice Whittaker) that civil disobedience is a legitimate response to immoral govern-
ment. He invoked the example of "our Puritan Fathers [sic]" to bolster his
argument. Charles E. Whittaker and William Sloane Coffin, Jr., Law, Order, and
Civil Disobedience 29 (1967).
Edmund Morgan elaborates on the notion of consent of the governed, which is
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Puritans' concern for their righteousness before God led
them to profound concern for the orders of society. Since all as-
pects of life were integrated under the rule of God, politics and
law were as much dimensions of religion as was worship. Even af-
ter Puritan theological zeal waned, the religious-like dedication to
political and legal matters had been planted too firmly in Ameri-
can soil to be dislodged.8 7
Puritans and Same-Sex Marriage
There is no suggestion that the Puritans would have sanc-
tioned same-sex marriage. The historical Puritans were people of
their times. Official abhorrence of "sodomy" or "unnatural acts"
was a part of their milieu.8 8 In their denunciations of homosexual-
ity Puritans were scarcely distinguishable from their counter-
parts.8 9 Puritans did not always follow their ideology to its logical
implicit in the doctrines of covenant. He finds the roots of American willingness to
break with England in the Puritan emphasis on the consent of parties to cove-
nants-whether personal or national. Morgan, supra note 8, at 368-72. The ruler
was "called" to serve the common good of those whom he governed. When the
ruler failed to do so, he was to be sanctioned or even overthrown. Id. at 372-73.
87. See generally Levinson, supra note 8.
88. See Stone, supra note 68, at 492-93.
89. Durston groups homosexuality with rape and prostitution as objects of Puri-
tan denunciations. Durston, supra note 69, at 31. He quotes one description of ho-
mosexuality as "unnatural heat" and "an impiety not to be credited to an honest
heart." Id. He does not, however, suggest that homosexuality was considered more
outrageous than other forms of sexual "immorality"-e.g., adultery, which if re-
peated, would have been punished by death (at least, if one Puritan had had his
way.) Id. (Homosexuality was probably not dwelt on in Puritan teaching at
lengths similar to other forms of sexual "misconduct".)
It is important to realize that until relatively recently there was no notion of
"homosexuality" as an identifiable human condition. The terms "homosexuality"
and "homosexual" are modern terms, originating in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Arthur N. Gilbert, Conceptions of Homosexuality and Sodomy
in Western History, in Historical Perspectives on Homosexuality 61 (Salvator J. Li-
cata and Robert P. Peterson eds. 1981) (citing Michel Foucault). Seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century Puritans did not have the scientific understanding with which
to rethink their time's general social disapproval of homosexual acts.
By the same token, there is reason to question whether the Puritans were as
completely aghast at the notion of homosexual behavior as we are inclined to think.
See, e.g., Martin Bauml Duberman, "Writhing Bedfellows" 1826-Two Young Men
from Antebellum South Carolina's Ruling Elite Share "Extravagant Delight", in
Historical Perspectives on Homosexuality 85 (Salvator J. Licata and Robert P. Pe-
terson eds. 1981). Two law students of Puritan background, who eventually became
prestigious members of society, share letters celebrating their physical joys in bed
together, apparently without shame or self-consciousness. For the thesis that ho-
mosexuality was considered a vice but was nevertheless tolerated, see B.R. Burg,
Ho Hum, Another Work of the DeviL" Buggery and Sodomy in Early Stuart Eng-
land, in Historical Perspectives on Homosexuality 69 (Salvator J. Licata and Robert
P. Peterson eds. 1981). See Stone, supra note 73, at 541-42, for the suggestion that
toleration for homosexuality was related to socio-economic class.
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implications. For example, while Puritans were remarkably ahead
of their times in affording equality and dignity to women in soci-
ety,90 they did not extend the right to vote to women. 91 As an-
other example, slavery was the subject of divisive concern for the
Puritans at the founding of this country, but their treatment of the
question-while radical in some quarters in their day92-- is unen-
lightened by modern standards. It is, therefore, neither surprising
nor contradictory to suggest that, while the Puritans themselves
would not have advocated legal status for same-sex marriage, Puri-
tan ideology planted the seeds which would blossom into just such
a stance.
The Puritans are important to contemporary legal analysis
because of their importance to the formation of American law;
their importance does not derive from their particular structures
of society or from their solutions to social problems. The history-
bound forms of their society are less important in modern times
than are the values that informed their social structure and what
they contributed to the American mix:
A political Puritan paradigm of covenant adequate to contem-
porary needs cannot be provided by simple resuscitation of
some Puritan commonwealth in old or New England.... What
we want to recover from the Puritan commonwealth is, not its
constitution, but the basic normative guidelines that follow
from its covenant structure of freedom and accountability. 93
The Puritan-Covenant Case for Same-Sex Marriage
There exists no systematic Puritan jurisprudence. 94 The ear-
liest Puritans did not develop one and modern advocates of cove-
nant theory have not yet undertaken the task. Even though law
and the ordering of society were of vital concern to Puritans,95 Pu-
90. Todd, supra note 4, at 96-97. See also E.S. Morgan, The Puritan Family:
Religion and Domestic Relations in Seventeenth-Century New England (rev. ed.
1966).
91. Abigail Adams was actively involved in political affairs even without the
vote. See, for example, Thomas Jefferson's letters to her on a variety of topics,
among them the Sedition Act of 1798. 4 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Mrs. Adams,
Jefferson Works 555 (Washington ed. 1871).
92. See, e.g., A Coppie of the Liberties of the Massachusets Colonie in New Eng-
land, in Morgan, supra note 4, at 196 ("There shall never be any bond slaverie, vil-
linage or Captivitie amongst us unles it be lawful Captives taken in just warres, and
such strangers as willingly selle themselves or are sold to us.")
93. Lovin II, supra note 55, at 1.
94. Contemporary scholars are, however, beginning to systematize Puritan so-
cial theory and to explore its implications. See Lovin I, supra note 24; Lovin H1,
supra note 55; and Douglas Sturm, Community and Alienation: Essays on Process
Thought and Public Life (1988).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 64-87.
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ritans did not isolate jurisprudential concerns from the rest of
their reflections on how to structure their lives in faithfulness to
their covenant with God. Still, it is possible to identify a set of ba-
sic jurisprudential principles-or "values"9--implicit in Puritan
ideology.
After an analysis of the "problem" posed by same-sex mar-
riage, this section of the article articulates major principles of Pu-
ritan jurisprudence. It relates those principles to modern
expressions of legal philosophy. Finally, it demonstrates that each
of those principles contributes to the substantial case for the legal
recognition of same-sex marriage. Legal recognition is not only
permissible under modern articulations of Puritan jurisprudence;
it is compelled.
Costs of the Denial of Legal Status to Same-Sex Marriage
Marriage between partners of the same sex is illegal in every
state.97 Despite legal prohibitions, however, gay men and lesbians
continue to form committed relationships, marriage-like in all as-
pects except legal status.9 8
The denial of legal status to the relationships does not have
merely incidental repercussions. The costs to a gay or lesbian
couple of being denied legal status for their relationship are enor-
mous. The denial of marriage to couples exposes them to discrimi-
nation from employers, landlords, and institutions offering
facilities to the public.99 Unmarried couples face discrimination in
housing.100 Gay and lesbian partners are generally barred from
96. Murphy, supra note 12.
97. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971); Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d
1187 (1974).
98. See Mary Mendola, The Mendola Report: A New Look at Gay Couples
(1980). Psychologist Charles Silverstein has described the varieties of and issues in
gay male love relationships and enlivened the discussion with extensive anecdotal
material. Charles Silverstein, Man to Man: Gay Couples in America (1981).
99. Graham Douthwaite, Unmarried Couples and the Law 6 (1979). See Devel-
opments, supra note 1, at 1610-23. See also Matthew A. Coles, The Case for Gay
Rights, 9 Hamline J. of Pub. L. and Pol. 237 (1988).
100. Developments, supra note 1, at 1612-13. There has been a move in housing
and zoning case law in favor of including a wide range of living arrangements under
the rubric "functional equivalents of families." See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 74
N.Y.2d 201, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 543 N.E.2d 49 (1989) (holding that the right of a fam-
ily member to continue to occupy a rent-controlled apartment should not be limited
to spouses and blood relatives of tenants). There is continuing difficulty, however,
for unmarried couples in securing housing. See, e.g., State by Cooper v. French, No.
C2-89-1064 (Minn. Aug. 31, 1990) (LEXIS, Minn library, Minn. file)(holding that the
Minnesota Human Rights Act does not protect unmarried cohabitants, even though
it prohibits discrimination on the basis of "marital status").
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spousal benefits under worker's compensation laws, since they are
not legal spouses.101 Married couples receive benefits from the
federal government which are denied to gay and lesbian partners,
such as special tax treatment 10 2 and Social Security benefits. 0 3
Not only does denial of legal recognition deprive same-sex
couples of entitlements accorded "married" couples, but the lack
of legal marital status limits the causes of action available in tort
to gay and lesbian partners. For example, a California court held
that an unmarried partner could not collect damages for negligent
infliction of emotional distress or loss of consortium.104 Another
court held that an intimate homosexual relationship does not fall
within the "close relationship" standard for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.' 05
Domestic relationship law is a field in which gay and lesbian
partners face definite hardship. The legal difficulties associated
with child custody' 06 and visitation,10 7 and with conceiving' 0 8 and
adopting children,10 9 are manifold. There are no rights of inheri-
tance for a gay or lesbian partner in the event of the death of the
other partner."l0 Since the famous Marvin v. Marvin ' decision
101. Developments, supra note 1, at 1618. "Only one workers' compensation
board has recognized the claim of an insured employee's gay partner." Id. at 1619.
102. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1, 6013(a) (1987) (joint return) and I.R.C. § 152 (1987) (de-
pendency deductions).
103. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-03.
104. Elden v. Shelden, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
105. Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1987).
106. See e.g., the analysis of Zenker v. Zenker in Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, Oct.
1989, at p. 51, col. 1. But see In re Pearlman, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1355 (holding
that a lesbian partner of a biological mother of a ten-year-old child was entitled to
custody as a "de facto" parent). See also Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-
Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection Analysis, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 617, 619-20
(1989) (documenting that courts are more likely to deny custody to a gay or lesbian
parent if that parent is in an intimate, same-sex relationship than when the parent
is single).
107. Douthwaite, supra note 99, at 111-46.
108. See, e.g., Donald Shapiro and Lisa Schultz, Single-Sex Families: The Impact
of Birth Innovations upon Traditional Family Notions, 24 J. Fain. L. 271 (1985-86).
See also Mary Hotvedt and Jane Barclay Mandel, Children of Lesbian Mothers, in
Homosexuality, supra note 1, at 275-85.
109. See Emily C. Patt, Second Parent Adoption: When Crossing the Marital
Barrier Is in a Child's Best Interests, 3 Berkeley Women's L.J. 96 (1988) (advocat-
ing second-parent adoption when couples have children and are not married or do
not wish to marry).
110. See Sol Lova, W1hen Is a Family not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxa-
tion of Inheritance within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 Idaho L. Rev. 353, 363
(1987-88) ("Unless... voluntary protections [such as drafting a will] have been cre-
ated, the survivor of such an unmarried couple . . . stands completely without in-
heritance rights.").
111. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). The notorious case of
Marc Christian's suit against the estate of Rock Hudson did not involve claims for
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there may be grounds, at least in California, for an unmarried het-
erosexual partner to get support from the other partner-so-called
"palimony." In the event that a gay or lesbian relationship breaks
up, however, there is no precedent for the award of such support
as is available to unmarried heterosexual partners."12 The experi-
ence of one lesbian couple in Minnesota demonstrates that the
lack of legal status for their relationship has adverse implications
even for one partner's rights to visit her disabled lover.113
The denial of legal recognition for same-sex marriage takes a
toll beyond the economic and legal costs. Richard Mohr has writ-
ten passionately of the intertwined legal and emotional burdens
that he and his "lover and husband" must bear as a result of the
lack of legal sanction for their relationship:
[I]n the eyes of the law we are necessarily strangers to each
other, people who had as well never met. In Illinois, [where
Mohr and his lover live] one cannot will one's body. By stat-
ute, it goes to next of kin. That which was most one's own-
the substrate for personality-which was most one's own for
another-that in which and by which one loved and made
love-is, for gays, not one's own at all. The lover is barred
from the lover's funeral. The compulsory intervention of het-
erosexuality at death is the final degradation worked by The
People on gay people. 114
spousal or quasi-spousal benefits. See Susan Adams, Money for Fear: Why a Jury
Awarded $21.75 Million Dollars to Rock Hudson's Lover, 11 Am. Law. 135 (July-
Aug. 1989).
112. Several authorities suggest that partners should sign pre-nuptial-like con-
tracts to cover contingencies of the relationship. See, e.g., Hayden Curry and Denis
Clifford, A Legal Guide for Lesbian and Gay Couples 22 (3d ed. 1985). See also Le-
nore Weitzman, The Marriage Contract (1981) (suggesting contractual arrange-
ments in lieu of formal marriage for all couples). The suggestion that the couple
sign a contract to cover foreseeable emergencies or contingencies is sound as far as
it goes. Such a contract, however, does not substitute for marriage.
The problems with proposals which substitute contracts for marriage is that
they miss the point: They often express a view of marriage as a less-than-desirable
arrangement. See Weitzman, supra. They fail to address the needs of those couples
who seek the social and emotional benefits which formal marriage accords. The
proposals also fail to account for the loss of legal and economic benefits to the
couple by virtue of their not being married. Finally, there is the danger that the
contracts will not be enforced. Farnsworth notes that "[c]ourts have traditionally
looked with disfavor upon... 'cohabitation contracts,' because they have regarded
them not only as immoral, but also as a threat to the institution of marriage." E.
Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 345-46 (1982). He goes on to discuss the Marvin deci-
sion, which he admits changes the legal atmosphere with regard to non-marital
agreements. But he points out that Marvin has not enjoyed universal acceptance.
Id. at 136.
113. See also Karen Thompson and Julie Andrezejewski, Why Can't Sharon Ko-
walski Come Home? (1988) (an account of Thompson's efforts to gain rights to visit
with her life partner after Kowalski's hospitalization with severe injuries stemming
from an accident).
114. Mohr, supra note 1, at 18.
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Numerous rationales have been offered to justify denial of
legal status to gay and lesbian marriage. Friedman identified and
evaluated several of the most common of those rationales.1 5 In
every case, she found the rationale inadequate to justify the
practice.116
States claim an interest in encouraging procreation, 117 but
such an interest cannot withstand scrutiny: Certainly, there is lit-
tle reason to fear the extinction of the human race from un-
derpopulation.1l 8 Neither do Supreme Court rulings with respect
to birth control and abortion support the assertion that the state
has an overriding interest in encouraging procreation.119
Concern for the well-being of children conceived within or
brought into a marriage is a legitimate state interest. But there is
no empirical evidence that the legalization of same-sex marriage
represents a threat to children of the marriage. Children are no
more likely to be molested by gay or lesbian parents than by het-
erosexual parents. 2 0 If the concern is to discourage development
of homosexual identity in children, there is no evidence that chil-
dren develop homosexual identities because of their families'
make-up.12' Children of gay or lesbian partners are no more apt
to be stigmatized if the partners are married than if they are
115. Comment, supra note 1, at 160-69.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 274, 259, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (1974)
("The refusal of the state to authorize same sex marrige results from [the] impossi-
bility of reproduction .... ).
118. Comment, supra note 1, at 161. As Friedman points out, no state has forbid-
den sterile men or women from marrying a member of the opposite sex. Id It is at
best questionable whether procreation is an interest which the state encourages by
denying marriage to same-sex couples. Indeed, reproductive technology allows les-
bians to bear children. Shapiro and Schultz, supra note 108, at 274. That fact
would obviate state objection to lesbian marriage if the objection is based on a de-
sire to encourage procreation.
119. Comment, supra note 1, at 161-62. The Court has given individuals' privacy
interests pre-eminence over any state interference, unless the state has an over-
whelming, legitimate reason for doing so. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1977).
120. See sources cited by Shapiro and Schultz, supra note 108, at 163. Studies
suggest that the rate of child molesters is lower within homosexual populations
than within heterosexual populations. William Paul, Introduction, in Homosexual-
ity, supra note 1, at 302.
121. Comment, supra note 1, at 163. The etiology of homosexuality is far from
ascertained. That it is a choice from among options is almost universally disputed
by psychologists and sociologists. See Weinrich, supra note 1, at 378-79. That sex-
ual orientation is established fairly early in life and is "immutable" is increasingly
accepted as beyond question. Richard Green, The Immutability of (Homo)Sexual
Orientation: Behavioral Science Implications for a Constitutional (Legal) Analy-
sis, 16 Psychiatry & L. 537 (1988) (Dr. Green is both Professor of Law and Profes-
sor of Psychiatry at U.C.L.A.).
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merely living together.122 There is thus little support for the claim
that children would be more "at risk" in gay- or lesbian-parent
families than they are in heterosexual-parent families. 123
Another claim advanced by those who oppose same-sex mar-
riage is that the denial of marriage to same-sex couples discourages
illegal homosexual activity.124 They argue that the state has an in-
terest in discouraging illicit sexual activity so as to encourage fidel-
ity, responsible sexual activity, and public health. By legalizing
same-sex marriage, however, the state does not give up authority
to regulate extramarital sexual activity. (Arguably a state would
have to decriminalize intramarital homosexual activity. Still, in
Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that while the right
to privacy protects marriage, procreation, and family decisions, it
does not necessarily protect all sexual practices in marriage.125
Thus the legalization of marriage between gays or lesbians would
not necessarily prevent a state with a sense of the ironic from
prohibiting certain sexual practices-as Georgia's sodomy statute
does.' 26)
Another common objection to same-sex marriage is that it
represents a challenge to the "traditional" family,127 but how
same-sex marriage would undermine the values associated with
family life is vaguely defined.128 The institution of same-sex mar-
riage would foster the same values as does heterosexual marriage:
Same-sex marriage would foster commitment, loyalty, and inti-
122. Comment, supra note 1, at 163-64. It may well be the case that children
would benefit from the enhanced social prestige which would accompany the recog-
nition of the marriage of the same-sex couple.
123. David J. Kleiber, Robert J. Howell, and Alta Lura Tibbits-Kleber, The Im-
pact of Parental Homosexuality in Child Custody: A Review of the Literature, 14
Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 81, 86 (1986).
124. Comment, supra note 1, at 164. That argument, of course, has no force in
the twenty-three states that have decriminalized homosexual activity between con-
senting adults. Id. at 164-65.
125. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986) (pointing out without
disapproval that in 1986 twenty-four States and the District of Columbia provided
for criminal penalties for sodomy).
126. Comment, supra note 1, at 164-65. The Hardwick majority appears to grant
such a point. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 215 (Justice Stevens dissenting)
(commenting on majority opinion). Justice Stevens attacks that point specifically,
concluding that a state must stay out of a married couple's sex life. Id. at 217-18.
127. Comment, supra note 1, at 168. A "traditional" family is an often-evoked
platitude. It is, however, difficult to define what a "traditional" family is. It is the
guess of the author of this article that "traditional" is usually meant to indicate
"nuclear" families. But nuclear families are not universally recognized as tradi-
tional or normal. See, e.g., Carol Stack, All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a
Black Community (1978) (an anthropological study of family life among a predomi-
nantly Black community in a small midwestern city, and sources cited by Penas,
supra note 64.).
128. See Comment, supra note 1, at 169.
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macy, just as does heterosexual marriage.129 There is no evidence
that gay men and lesbian women in committed relationships are
any less committed to the permanency of their relationships than
are heterosexual partners.1 3 0 If, on the other hand, the fear is that
legalization of same-sex marriage would lessen the appeal of oppo-
site-sex marriage, the answer is obvious: People do not choose
their sexual orientation;13 ' neither, then, for the vast majority of
people, is the gender of a potential marriage partner a matter of
choice.
Courts have given permission for the majority culture to pro-
mote and impose its cultural and moral norms, and some justify
legal hostility toward gay and lesbian couples by recourse to a his-
tory of disfavor of homosexuality.I3 2 But under the Constitution
there are limits to majority rule:
Majority rule is simply not the same thing as constitutional-
ism, as that concept was classically defined. One cannot un-
derstand the notion of a constitution, at least prior to
twentieth-century thought, without including its role of plac-
ing limits on the ability of majorities (or other rulers) to do
whatever they wish in regard to minorities who lose out in
political struggles.' 3
3
129. See sources cited in Comment, supra note 1, at 157 nn.151-52 & 158-68.
130. See Mendola, supra note 98, at 68-69. Indeed, gays and lesbians may show
greater capacity to establish durable relationships than do heterosexuals: Many are
able to maintain long-term relationships despite the lack of official legal and social
supports on which heterosexual couples can count and despite formally sanctioned
discrimination. Richard Mohr has rhapsodized on the nature of gay "marriage" and
of his own in particular:
The sanctifications that descend instantly through custom and ritual
on current marriages, descend gradually over and through time on gay
one is .... [Tihe sacred values and loyal intimacies contained in a gay
marriage are products of the relation itself, are truly the couple's own.
Marriages are patens for value. In this, though, they vary like pati-
nas .... Gay marriages . . . are like the development of a patina on
wood. The warming, the enriching, the surface that is depth, the
depth that is sheen are a result of a necessary age .... And so, after a
decade together, we feel and to many puzzled others appear more mar-
ried than the married.
Mohr, supra note 1, at 18. See also C.A. Tripp, The Homosexual Matrix 159 (2d ed.
1987) ("Mhe settled-in qualities of the homosexual couple tend to be precisely
those which characterize the stable heterosexual relationship.").
131. Green, supra note 121, at 569. Heterosexuals do not choose their sexual na-
ture and would certainly not choose same-sex marriage. Homosexual marriage is,
thus, not alluring to the majority of people. See Watkins v. United States Army,
847 F.2d 1329, 1347-48, reh'g en banc ordered by 847 F.2d 1362, opinion withdrawn
on reh' by 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing the immutability of homosexual-
ity and its relationship to equal protection).
132. Comment, supra note 1, at 167. See, e.g., Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 193-94.
133. Levinson, supra note 8, at 70. See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 210
(Justice Brennan dissenting) ("I cannot agree that either the length of time a ma-
jority has held its convictions or the passion with which it defends them can with-
draw legislation from this Court's scrutiny."). Such a view echoes the Puritan
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The issue of the rights of gay and lesbian people-and in par-
ticular the right to legal recognition of their committed relation-
ships-will not go away. The issue is of vital concern, not only to
gay and lesbian Americans, but also to heterosexual Americans.
Puritan covenant analysis reveals that what is at stake is fidelity
not just to the letter of American law, but also to its "spirit" or its
"heart". Puritan covenant analysis reveals both what is at stake in
the argument and how to resolve the problem.
Special Protection for Relationships
As a first principle, covenant theory "both in affirmations of
its ideals and [in] lamentations over its failure, reminds us that re-
lationships between persons in . . . society carry a special
weight." 134 That is, because of their importance in the overall
scheme of life, personal relationships are due special attention and
protection. The fundamental premise of covenant theory is that
human life is communal, interpersonal, social35: "[Ojur lives ...
are caught up with each other. They cannot be lived in splendid
isolation, each pursuing an independent pathway .... ,"136 Cove-
nanting with others-individuals and collectivities-is of the es-
sence of human being.
Among covenants, marriage is special. Marriage is a covenant
between two independent people and the most basic expression of
the communal nature of human being.137 The marriage bond em-
bodies, in covenant terms, a community of mutual "love and ser-
vice, cooperation and care."1 38 It is the basic level of social
involvement.139 The Puritan view suggests that marriage is due
emphasis on personal dignity and has significant implications for the majority's in-
terference with interpersonal relationships. Constitutional rights cannot be
abridged by majoritarian moral beliefs. Furthermore, there is little reason for the
majority to do so.
134. Lovin II, supra note 55, at 1.
135. See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
136. Sturm, supra note 94, at 61.
137. See Witte, supra note 4, at 594-95.
138. Id. at 595. It may very well be that many marriages are far from the models
of mutual respect and care that covenant theory believes it possible for them to be.
See, e.g., Lenore Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change,
62 Calif. L. Rev. 1235-36 (1974), for a denunciation of marriage as an oppressive re-
gime. That such criticism identifies an essential and unavoidable flaw in the insti-
tution, however, is disputed by the vast numbers of people who apply for license to
marry. From a covenant perspective, marriage has at least the potential to be a lib-
erating influence. See Laurence D. Houlgate, Family and State: The Philosophy of
Family Law 57-67 (1988).
139. Lovin II, supra note 55, at 1. Puritans added a special touch to the most
liberal view of marriage in their day. They stressed the qualities of consent and
companionship over that of procreation. They did not completely ignore marriage
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special care and protection. Marriage is fundamentally important
to the people involved, of the utmost importance to them. As
such, it is also of utmost importance to society.'4 0 As an institu-
tion, marriage contributes to the common good of society.
Such high respect for the covenant between two people is
neither unique to the Puritan view nor lost to the past. Time and
again, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized-at least implic-
itly-that one-to-one relationships are of vital importance to the
fulfillment of liberty. Thus, for example, it has severely restricted
the power of states to interfere with an individual's decisions about
whether and whom to marry,141 birth control,142 with whom to
live,143 child care and education,'" and whether to carry a fetus to
term.145 The Court has had to struggle, however, to articulate a
rationale for such protection.146 Most decisions propound an indi-
vidualistic, social-contract147 doctrine of "privacy" or "fundamen-
tal" rights. For example, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority
in Griswold, identified a "penumbra of privacy" among the rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.4 8 The argument is that the Bill
of Rights is not a limited specific list of rights aside from which
there are no others guaranteed.149 Rather, the Bill of Rights de-
scribes a field of rights from which it is possible to extrapolate spe-
cific applications. The Bill of Rights establishes a zone of
individual autonomy which the government may not invade or
as the setting for the conception and rearing of children. They did, however, re-
place child-bearing with companionship as the chief point of marriage. Id. at 5.
140. Witte, supra note 4, at 595 ("The married couple, the covenant family,
played a vital role in society, alongside the church and the state.").
141. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's law forbidding
interracial marriage on grounds that marriage is a fundamental right against which
Virginia could assert no compelling state interest).
142. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that interference
with decisions regarding the use of contraception is an unconstitutional violation of
due process).
143. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a housing or-
dinance which restricted cohabitation to certain configurations of blood relatives).
But see Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (holding that there is no fundamen-
tal right to share housing with people to whom one is not related).
144. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a statute
requiring parents to send their children to public schools, thereby preventing their
sending children to private or parochial schools).
145. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
146. Comment, supra note 1, at 153.
147. See supra note 67.
148. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
149. Id. at 492 (Justice Goldberg concurring) ("[Tihe Ninth Amendment shows a
belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not ex-
pressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent that the list of
rights included there not be deemed exhaustive.").
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violate.150
Covenant theory reinforces "privacy theory"'151 while also
transcending it. It builds on the view that not all of the "rights" of
members of society are articulated in specific passages of the Con-
stitution.152 In the case of marriage, protection does not depend
solely on "penumbral" guarantees of individual liberty located
within the interstices of constitutional amendments. It is
grounded in the "morality" of the Constitution's framers, which
morality can be "translate[d] . . . into . . . rule[s] to cover unfore-
seen circumstances. "153
Marriage is a fundamental right'54-whether considered from
the standpoint of "privacy" doctrine or from covenant theory.
States must have a substantial reason for interfering with or deny-
ing marriage to heterosexual couples. 5 5 There is insufficient rea-
son to deny its benefits to couples who are of the same sex.
Covenant ideology asserts that committing to a relationship is a ba-
sic expression of being human. Such commitment is no less funda-
150. Id. at 484.
151. "Privacy" may be a misnomer, from a covenant point of view. The issues
commonly protected under "privacy" doctrine have very public implications. Nev-
ertheless, it is beyond the scope of this article to rename well-established constitu-
tional doctrines.
152. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-84. The most vehement critics of privacy doc-
trine-e.g., Robert Bork--are surprisingly quiet about the ninth amendment to the
Constitution. Levinson, supra note 8, at 86. The ninth amendment provides that
"[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. Const. amend. IX. That
amendment strongly indicates that citizen rights are not restricted to those rights
set forth in the Constitution and amendments. Justice Goldberg makes this point
in his concurrence in Griswold. 381 U.S. at 488. For a discussion of the ninth
amendment and its potential importance for constitutional decision-making, see
Randy E. Barrett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1988).
See also Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 Chi.[-]Kent L. Rev.
37 (1988). If that is the case, covenant social theory is an authoritative source to be
consulted in order to identify what those unenumerated-but-protected rights are.
153. Levinson, supra note 8, at 81 (quoting Robert Bork).
154. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men (sic] .... Marriage is one of the basic civil rights .. ")
Courts have consistently rejected strict scrutiny of marriage laws that distinguish
between heterosexual and homosexual orientation. The United States Supreme
Court, for example, dismissed the appeal from Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191
N.W.2d 185 (1971) "for want of substantial federal question." 409 U.S. 810 (1971).
Courts and legislatures need not remain bound, however, to a past that gives short
shrift to fundamental rights not heretofore recognized. See Loving's rejection of
the rationale in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), as "represent[ing] a limited
view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in subsequent
decisions of this court." Loving, 388 U.S. at 10. Both courts and legislatures should
be confronted with the covenant case for same-sex marriage and convinced to re-
verse that part of legal tradition which denies recognition to same-sex marriage.
155. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9.
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mental for gay men and lesbian women than it is for heterosexual
couples.156 The need to connect with another is felt as keenly by
homosexual people as by heterosexual people.157
There is no valid reason to distinguish between homosexual
and heterosexual couples in matters regarding the right to marry;
studies suggest that homosexual couples are virtually indistin-
guishable from homosexual couples. 15s In many cases, gays and
lesbians already live in de facto marriages.15 9 Many have formal-
ized and publicized their commitment through rituals, even though
those rituals do not have legal effect.160
Richard Mohr suggests the positive consequences of legalizing
gay and lesbian marriage: "[I]f current discrimination, which
drives gays into hiding and into anonymous relations, was lifted...
one would see gays forming [families]. Virtually all gays express a
desire to have a permanent lover .... In general, when afforded
the opportunity, gays have shown an amazing tendency to nest."'161
The legal recognition of gay and lesbian marriages would afford all
people, regardless of their sexual nature, the opportunity to fulfill
this aspect of their human nature. From a covenantal perspective,
no less can be demanded of a social order.162 No one suggests that
all gay or lesbian couples would choose to marry. To deny the op-
tion to those who would marry, however, is to deny them a basic
guarantee of the Constitution as Puritans would understand that
document.
Equality for All
The heart of covenant theory is the affirmation of the equal-
156. See Comment, supra note 1, at 152-60 (due process analysis).
157. Note, supra note 1, at 1791. "Reality belies the myth of homosexuals as ab-
errant loners who bear no relation to the tenderness associated with marriage and
the family.... The human proclivity for forming traditional [sic] family bonds is
deeply socially ingrained and not dependent on sexual orientation." Id.
158. Tripp, supra note 96, at 159. See also Mendola, supra note 96. See also the
review of the literature on gay and lesbian relationships in the following articles:
Paul C. Larson, Gay Male Relationships, in Homosexuality, supra note 1; and Leti-
tia Anne Peplau and Hortensia Amar, Understanding Lesbian Relationships, in Ho-
mosexuality, supra note 1. See also Mohr, supra note 1, at 17-18.
159. Mendola, supra note 98, at 2-3.
160. Id. at 3.
161. Mohr, supra note 1, at 44. Mohr goes on to suggest that the social and legal
hostility to homosexuality makes the development of committed relationships diffi-
cult: "[A] life of hiding is a tense and pressured existence not easily shared with
another." Id.
162. Lovin II, supra note 55, at 10 ("(In covenant thought flreedom occurs when
a claim against the resources of the community is honored by the society's systems




ity of all people.163 In Puritan thought, even the covenant be-
tween God and humanity involved God's treatment of humanity as
an equal.164 The centrality of personhood and the dignity with
which each person was to be treated were and are hallmarks of
covenant thought.165
Covenant equality is equality of participation in society and in
the apparatus by which decisions about that society are made.166
Covenant affords a dynamic model of relationships in which cove-
nant partners "sustain one another, contribute to one another, and
constitute a creative center for the ongoing life of the commu-
nity."'167 Participation is an end in itself; it is not simply a means
to some other end, such as peace in society. 68
Participation is more than equality "before law"X69 -that is,
equality in some procedural sense. The concept of equality of par-
ticipation includes equality of opportunity and of access to the
"benefits" of society.170 Through their participation, people share
in the benefits of the whole society, and they learn to gear their
individual and group contributions to the "common good" of the
society.171 It is incumbent on a legal system to remove any and all
barriers to full and equal participation by all people.
The dual qualities of equality and participation categorically
forbid the suppression of or discrimination against minorities. It is
a radical denial of covenant for a majority of the members of soci-
163. Lovin I, supra note 24, at 251.
164. Id. at 251-52 (quoting a seventeenth-century British Puritan divine).
165. Social contract theory is also built on notions of equality: Every individual
has an equal right to pursue her aims without stint. See id at 249. On that basis,
everyone's powers to seek individual fulfillment had equally to be checked. Id.
The sovereign who was charged with enforcing the social contract (whereby indi-
viduals foreswore certain of their natural powers in exchange for others' doing the
same) owed a duty to hold everyone in the society in rough parity. IM at 248-51.
Contractarian equality is self-centered. It is focused on the individual's choice
for herself of how to live her life. It is, as such, amoral-offering no norm by which
to judge those choices. Those choices are essentially private. See Lovin II, supra
note 55, at 12-13.
166. Lovin I, supra note 24, at 256-57.
167. Sturm, supra note 94, at 85.
168. Lovin H, supra note 55, at 12.
169. Equality "before law"-e.g., "procedural" equality-is important. But if
equality were nothing more, it would amount to a perpetuation of existant injus-
tice. For example, it is not sufficient, from a covenant perspective to offer a slave
impartial treatment within the rules of the plantation--even though that could be
interpreted by some as "just." See Sturm, supra note 94, at 100-01.
170. See id, at 101-02. Anthony Honore asserted that "all men [sic] considered
merely as men [sic] and apart from their conduct or choice have a claim to an equal
share in all those things .... called advantages, which are generally desired and are
in fact conducive to their well-being." Anthony Honore, Social Justice, in Essays in
Legal Philosophy 62 (Robert S. Summers ed. 1976).
171. See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
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ety to draw lines of participation in the society in such a way as to
exclude others.172 To do so is to deny the humanity of those ex-
cluded, effectively denying them both a voice in their own destiny
and an opportunity to contribute to the common good.173
The society which is faithful to covenant, therefore, must be
an open society. A society cannot be accounted free if it closes the
door on members--any members. If it does so, it is not a covenant
community, for it has thereby institutionalized inequality and
barred certain would-be members from the society. Society, if it is
to be faithful to the covenant model, must be amenable to
change.174 It must be willing to allow participation by all the
members of society to bring about change. An open society is one
equally respectful of tradition, contemporary communication, and
creativity.175 Neither the stability of the past nor the innovations
of the future can be easily ignored. Both must be tested, however,
against the ideal of full participation by all persons in society.
The importance of equality in covenant theory "requires a
method something like. .. 'strict scrutiny' of any deviation from a
standard of equality .... " 176 Unless the state can demonstrate a
compelling reason for discrimination, discrimination must be aban-
doned.177 Any less is the society's breaking faith with those who
are the objects of discrimination. Social change to eliminate dis-
crimination has priority over other frequently expressed concerns
for cautious development or pragmatic deliberation. "The cove-
nantal idea of equality overrules the usual objections of prudence
to tampering with social systems that seem to be working effi-
ciently, if not altogether fairly."'178
The Constitution already provides for such equality, but with-
out the emphasis of covenant theory the radicality of the Constitu-
172. Lovin I, supra note 24, at 248.
173. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
174. Lovin II, supra note 55, at 15 ("Maintaining a participatory equality re-
quires a priority for justified claims over existing institutional procedures and even
over the most widespread popular expectations.").
175. Cf. Sturm, supra note 94, at 85. Covenant communities are often accused-
and, in many cases, with good reason--of rigidity and homogeneity. See Lovin II,
supra note 55, at 11. Zeal often results in insensitivity towards those not similarly
zealous. But the ideal of covenantal respect for the equality of all people forecloses
bigotry. Open-mindedness is a requirement occasioned by respect due all people in
their disparate conditions and situations. Lovin I, supra note 24, at 253.
176. Lovin i1, supra note 55, at 14-15.
177. Id. Lovin understates the burden on the state to justify discrimination
under strict scrutiny: To survive equal protection challenge under strict scrutiny, a
state must establish that the discrimination is necessary and narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest. See John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda, and J. Nelson
Young, Constitutional Law § 14.3 (3d ed. 1986).
178. Lovin II, supra note 55, at 15.
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tion's guarantees is often ignored. The Equal Protection Clause
mandates that the government act to end discrimination against
disadvantaged groups, regardless of the depth or history of social
contempt for the group.179 Built into the Constitution's structure
is a means for "look[ing] forward, serving to invalidate practices
that were widespread at the time of [the Constitution's] ratification
and that were expected to endure."180 Where due process guaran-
tees fail to protect substantive rights, the Equal Protection Clause
may be invoked to protect "fundamental rights."181 The Equal
Protection Clause allows the Constitution to transcend "common
law," "status quo baselines," and "Anglo-American conventions" in
favor of a much broader principle of equality.18 2
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Constitution
requires treating people equally with respect to the right to marry:
In Loving v. Virginia,8 3 the Court struck down a Virginia law
that prohibited interracial marriages. The law, which classified po-
tential marriage partners on the basis of race, violated the Four-
teenth Amendment and was "subversive of the principle of
equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment.... ."184 Since
the freedom to marry is "vital" and "essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men [sic],"185 legal obstacles can only be
justified by compelling state interest effectuated by narrowly tai-
lored means. 86
From a covenant perspective, the equal-protection case for
same-sex marriage is even stronger than the due process argument
179. Cass Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Re-
lationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161, 1163
(1988). Sunstein understands the Due Process Clause to be much less "activist"
than the Equal Protection Clause:
From its inception, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted
largely . . . to protect traditional practices against short-run depar-
tures .... [It] often looks backward; it is highly relevant to the Due
Process issue whether an existing or time-honored convention, de-
scribed at the proper level of generality, is violated by the practice
under attack.
Id. The Equal Protection Clause, in marked contrast, has been employed in much
more radical ways to eliminate discrimination, "however deeply engrained and
longstanding." Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1169-70.
182. Id. at 1174.
183. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
184. Id. at 12 (discussing the denial of due process as a ground additional to equal
protection for invalidating Virginia's law).
185. Id.
186. Strict scrutiny of marriage regulations was affirmed in Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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discussed above.' 8 7 The fundamental assumption of covenant ide-
ology is that all members of society are to be treated with funda-
mental equality. Coupled with the in-place radical Constitutional
guarantee of equal protection, that assumption argues vigorously
against the denial of marriage to gay and lesbian couples. To deny
them the right to marry is to foreclose their enjoying the "bene-
fits" of marriage-benefits which are legal, economic, and emo-
tional.188 Denial of the right to marry thus excludes them from
full participation in the life of the society. It relegates them to the
margins of society and isolates them from the processes of govern-
ment by which they were banished to the periphery. 8 9
To deny marriage to same-sex couples violates an essential
aspect of government, as Puritan covenant theory understands
government. It violates the basic human dignity of gay and lesbian
people by treating them as inferiors and excluding them from the
society. The fact that no suggested state interest withstands scru-
tiny' 90 compounds the outrage.
The Common Good
A third major strain in covenant thought concerns what is
called "the common good." Politics, according to covenant theory,
has as its raison d'etre and its goal the service of society. Its pur-
pose is to serve the public good.191 That public good, however, is
not divorced from the good of the individual; it does not have a sig-
nificance beyond or transcending the individual:
[P]ublic good is the good of the public. It is the good of the
open society itself. It is the good of the relationships through
which the members of the community sustain one another,
contribute to one another, and constitute a creative center for
the ongoing life of the community. To act in the public good is
187. See text accompanying supra notes 141-60. Friedman argues the opposite
case. See Comment, supra note 1, at 169 (arguing that substantive due process is
the strongest ground for supporting same-sex marriage). See also Note, supra note
1, at 185-88 for a discouraging analysis of "traditional equal protection analysis"
which the author understands to "legitimize existing inequity."
188. See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
189. To require, as a condition of acceptance, that one person be like everyone
else is to guarantee that the one will never be treated as an equal: "Those who most
need equal treatment will be the least similar, socially, to those whose situation sets
the standard as against which one's entitlement to be equally treated is measured."
Catherine MacKinnon, quoted in Note, Marriage: Homosexual Couples Need Not
Apply, 23 New Eng. L. Rev. 515, 539 (1988) (emphasis in the original). To refuse
acceptance on the basis of difference is, thus, to force the unaccepted one to
margins.
190. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
191. See Sturm, supra note 94, at 83-85; and supra notes 76-86 and accompanying
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not to deny the individuality of persons of associations, but it is
to reject the indifference to others of individualism.192
The function of the legal process is "to pursue ways and means of
improving [the] quality [of living together]. It is to create and to
sustain those relationships in which the actions of each enhance
the life of all."'1 93 Both individuals and the society itself are duty-
bound to work toward the well-being of all individuals.
Covenant theory recognizes that there is no "public life" sep-
arate from the individual and collective existences of the individu-
als.194 Conversely, the life of each individual is wrapped up with
the lives of others. Service to the well-being of the individual and
service to society are inextricably linked. If one person is harmed,
all people suffer. If one individual harms another, the entire web
of social relationships-which is to say, the society-is assaulted:
If public action harms an individual, the greater society is also
thereby harmed. That harm, furthermore, is not some idealistic
imperfection; it is a real and palpable harm. For the stability of a
society is in direct proportion to the extent to which it "invites and
ultimately requires" citizens to achieve "full citizenship" in the so-
ciety and "places them in reciprocal relationship to each other."195
The legitimacy of a social order is integrally related to the well-
being of the individuals within society. By assuring the well-being
of individuals, a social order serves the good of all. A society is not
merely "less good" because it treats some people inhumanely; it is
no society at all. A society which breaches the public or common
good reverts to lawlessness and threatens to destroy itself.
Society, to the extent that it has an existence independent of
those people whom it comprises, benefits when it serves all those
who constitute society. Thus,
civil liberties do not fulfill a function only for the individual.
In principle, they fulfill a critical function for the political as-
sociation as well, indeed, for the entire community of being.
Civil liberties are a means for effective participation in com-
munal decisions. They are a means to press for reform and to
introduce novel patterns of relationship. They constitute a
structure within which and through which persons and groups
may contribute alternative modes of thought and styles of life
to the ongoing community. 196
192. Sturm, supra note 94, at 85.
193. Id. at 21.
194. The contrast to a social-contract understanding of society is stark. The dis-
advantage of any one person or group-so long as it is a minority of the society-
does not threaten the existence of a social-contract society. See Lovin I, supra note
24, at 250-51.
195. Niebuhr, supra note 36, at 132.
196. Sturm, supra note 94, at 86.
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By drawing persons into the social matrix, the society elicits their
loyalty and their effort in behalf of the well-being of the society.
It accomplishes the integration of society-i.e., the integrity, unity,
and wholeness of the community.
By denying legal recognition to same-sex marriage, American
society denies itself the loyalty and integration of a segment of its
population. Not only does it disserve those people, but it also dis-
serves itself. By recognizing same-sex marriage, society could
channel the personal and political energy of gay and lesbian
couples into the society and not away from it. By including them,
instead of excluding them, the society establishes its authority
with them in such a way as to encourage them to "make an 'inter-
nal' commitment to covenant"x97-- commitment to each other and
to the society.
A function of covenant society is to assist the members of so-
ciety to adjust their desires from self-interest toward the good of
the larger community. 198 It can only do so if it brings those mem-
bers into commerce with the wider society. If it blocks the partici-
pation in society by some, it fractures the unity of the society and
destroys the community by and through which individual desires
or interests are socialized.199 That much should be clear from the
African-American civil rights movement.
Richard Mohr implies that the legal recognition of same-sex
marriage would be good for America beyond its good to individual
Americans:
[I]n extending to gays the rights and benefits it has reserved
for its dominant culture and extended selectively to others,
America would confirm its deeply held, nearly religious vision
of itself as a morally progressing nation, a nation itself advanc-
ing and serving as a beacon for others-especially with regard
to human rights.... Ours is a nation given to a prophetic polit-
ical rhetoric which acknowledges that morality is not arbitrary
and that justice is not merely the expression of the current
collective will.2 0 0
The legal recognition of same-sex marriage would confirm
America's commitment to full justice for all people. It would
thereby strengthen America's claim to "legitimacy." It would jus-
tify society's claim of authority over one segment of the population
that currently experiences that authority as repression.
197. Lovin II, supra note 55, at 13.
198. Lovin 1, supra note 24, at 247.
199. See Lovin II, supra note 55, at 12-13.




Legal analysis of complex and troubling social problems is a
sophisticated enterprise. It calls for the contributions of a range of
thinkers, not just legal scholars, legislators, and judges. Legal
decisionmaking is "contextual," 201-i.e., it implicates sources of
learning outside of case reporters and hornbooks. Values, history,
and interpretive frameworks influence how law is made.202 Legal
decisions "must be defended as flowing from a coherent and un-
compromised vision of fairness and justice, because that, in the last
analysis, is what the rule of law really means." 203
The treatment of same-sex marriage by the American legal
establishment raises profound questions about "the fairness and
justice" of that treatment. Gay and lesbian couples are denied the
full benefit of their citizenship by laws that refuse legal sanction
for same-sex marriages. That legal posture can and should be
changed.
Supporting a change in the law is the strain of social thought
which this paper calls "Puritan covenant thought." Originating in
the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century religious movement, Puri-
tan social thought transcended both its religious origins and its
sphere of influence in New England. Puritanism was a dominant
intellectual strain which contributed to the development of the
new land that became the United States. The importance of that
strain of thought should be re-recognized 204 and its themes resusci-
tated to inform legal and political decisions.
Puritan covenant thought buttresses the arguments which
come from many different perspectives 205 in favor of the legal rec-
ognition of gay and lesbian marriages. The decision to legalize
such marriages would afford gays and lesbians the kind of support
for their committed relationships which the society rightly offers
heterosexual marriages. It would be a step toward the full partici-
pation of gays and lesbians in American society, recalling them
from the margins of society where they have been forced by legal-
ized discrimination. American society itself would benefit from
the decision. It would be able more reasonably to count on the loy-
alty of those whom it would newly include among its full citizens;
201. See Farber, supra note 14, at 133; and Levinson, supra note 38, at ch. 1.
202. Levinson, supra note 8, at ch. 1.
203. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 2 (1985).
204. It is a relatively recent phenomenon that the importance of Puritan thought
as an important strain of American intellectual history need be defended. See
Niebuhr, supra note 39.
205. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 1 (feminist theory); Mohr, supra note 1 (gay
rights philosophy); Sunstein, supra note 179 (republican theory).
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it would be truer to its declared ideals; and it would be a more
complete incarnation of the just and equitable commonwealth its
Founders envisioned.

